Abstract: Restrictions on the ownership structure of a public company may harm the companys performance by preventing owners from choosing the best structure. We examine the stock-price performance and ownership structure, before and after the expiration of anti-takeover regulations, of a sample of thrift institutions that converted from mutual to stock ownership. We find that after the anti-takeover provisions expire, firm performance improves significantly, and the portions of the firm owned by managers, noninstitutional outside blockholders, and the firms employee stock ownership plan increase. Changes in performance are positively associated with changes in ownership by managers and by noninstitutional outside blockholders but negatively associated with changes in ownership by employee stock ownership plans.
The effect of changes in ownership structure on performance:
Evidence from the thrift industry
Introduction
The separation of ownership and control in corporations and the resulting reduction in firm performance have recently reengaged researchers' attention (see, for example, the January/March 1988 special issue of the Journal of Financial Economics.) Their concern is due to shareholders' loss of control over the managers of public corporations, who are then able to pursue their own interests rather than those of the shareholders.
In this study, we investigate the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance during 1987-93 using a sample of 88 thrift institutions that converted from mutual to stock ownership in 1983-87. We focus on the thrift industry for two reasons. The first is related to a provision of Federal Home Loan Bank Board mutual-to-stock conversion regulations known as the Post-Conversion Anti-Takeover Rule which prohibits any insider or outsider from owning more than 10% of a converting thrifts equity for three to five years following conversion. The restriction on outside ownership at the very least protects incumbent managers from the discipline of the market for corporate control (e.g., Jensen and Ruback, 1983) . It can also prevent a recently converted institution from choosing the optimal percentage of insider ownership, weakening managerial incentives (e.g., Jensen and Murphy, 1990 ). Thus, regulation of the firm's ownership structure has the potential to hurt shareholders by motivating insiders to deviate from value-maximizing decisions.
The second, but less important, reason for focusing on the thrift industry is that it allows us to better control for intra-industry differences across firms. The production technology and accounting practices of firms in the thrift industry are far more homogeneous than those of firms in other industries. Homogeneity of production technology is ensured by -2-Managers can increase shareholder value in at least two ways. First, they can 1 reduce excess perquisite consumption, and second, they can invest in riskier assets, effecting wealth transfers to shareholders from creditors, including the deposit insurance fund. See Kane (1995) for a general discussion. Our findings do not differentiate between the two. the qualified thrift lender (QTL) test imposed by regulators on thrifts, which requires them to hold at least 60% of their ªportfolioº assets in residential mortgages, mortgage-backed securities, and other narrowly specified asset classes to be able to borrow from a Federal
Home Loan Bank (FHLB). FHLB advances, as these loans are known, allow a depository institution to obtain funds at rates below those available in the marketplace, and are the major advantage of belonging to the FHLB system. Homogeneity of accounting practices is a function of additional regulations requiring each thrift to file a comprehensive and standardized report of income and condition, equivalent to a balance sheet and income statement, on a quarterly basis.
We find a significant increase in the percentage of the firm owned by the largest inside stockholder and a significant improvement in firm performance after the anti-takeover provisions expire. Moreover, the greater the increase in insider ownership, the greater the improvement in performance. The latter finding is consistent with Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Kane (1995) , who suggest that managers' incentives to maximize shareholder value increase with their ownership stake. 1 We also find that the portions of the firm owned by the largest noninstitutional blockholder and by the firms employee stock ownership plan increase significantly after the anti-takeover provisions expire. Moreover, changes in firm performance are positively associated with changes in ownership by the largest noninstitutional blockholder but -3-A number of authors have argued that the firms ownership structure is endogenous. See, for example, Demsetz (1983) and Fama and Jensen (1983) . Masulis (1987) examines the mutual-to-stock conversion process for thrift 3 institutions and concludes ªthat, on average, all the major claimants in the [mutual savings and loans] choosing to convert to stock charter gain from this action.º Esty (1993) reports a positive relationship between insider ownership and firm risk-taking.
negatively associated with changes in ownership by employee stock ownership plans. The former finding is consistent with Jensen and Rubacks (1983) view that the market for corporate control plays a disciplinary role; the latter finding is consistent with the view that employee stock ownership plans are often used to impede takeovers. We do not find that the largest institutional blockholders, on average, adjust their share holdings after the antitakeover provisions expire, nor do we find a link between ownership by the largest institutional blockholders and firm performance.
Our findings have several important research and policy implications. First, they provide a direct response to questions raised by Jensen and Warner (1988, p. 13-14) in their summary of the findings of cross-sectional studies testing the relation between insider ownership and firm value. Jensen and Warner indicate that the empirical estimates of the relation are not resolved because the studies treat ownership as exogenous. They also point 2 out that previous studies do not explain why ownership concentration is not chosen to maximize firm value. Evidence presented here suggests that ownership is endogenous. Our findings also provide empirical evidence regarding the effects on performance of political and legal restraints on ownership and control in support of Roe (1990) . Third, our findings extend the literature establishing the effects of ownership on firm performance, which with a few exceptions has ignored financial institutions. Fourth, our findings have significant 3 -4-Neither author, however, addresses the effect of anti-takeover provisions on the ownership structure and performance of the converted stock institutions.
In two other studies, Crawford , Ezzell, and Miles (1995) and Hubbard and Palia (1995) examine the effect of deregulation of interstate banking during the 1980s on pay-performance sensitivity of CEOs. They find an improvement in payperformance sensitivity after deregulation and increases in both insider ownership and the use of equity-based compensation. In contrast to those studies, which focus on the effect of the relaxation of restrictions on the firms investment and operating policies, we study the effect of the relaxation of restrictions on the firms ownership and compensation structures.
implications for the regulation of depository institutions: By providing a better understanding of managerial incentives and disincentives, they should help regulators and lawmakers as they evaluate competing arguments about how to achieve a stronger, more competitive financial system.
Finally, our results have important implications for research in the efficiency and expense preference behavior of mutual versus stock charter thrifts (e.g., Mester (1991) and Hermalin and Wallace (1994) ). Studies that analyze stock thrifts prior to expiration of antitakeover provisions can understate the efficiency and performance of stock-charter thrifts.
The next section discusses in some detail the effect of regulation on firm ownership and performance. Section 3 describes our data and methodology, and section 4 presents our results. Section 5 summarizes and concludes the paper.
The Post-Conversion Anti-Takeover Rule
The Post-Conversion Anti-Takeover Rule ("the Rule") governed the conversion of Kane (1983) estimates was insolvent by $42 billion at the end of 1976.
The Rule prohibits any person from directly or indirectly acquiring more than 10% of the beneficial ownership of any class of equity of an FSLIC-insured savings institution converted in accordance with the FHLBB's Conversion Regulation for a period of three years following completion of the conversion without prior written approval of the FHLBB (12 C.F.R. § 563 b.3(i)(7)). The Rule covers stock options, warrants, or other rights to purchase any class of equity securities, and any securities convertible into equity securities. The equity -6-securities need not have voting rights to be covered by the Rule (see Williams (1994, pp. 7-82 ) for discussion). The term ªpersonº is defined to include ªan individual, a group acting in concert, a corporation, a partnership, an association, a joint stock company, a trust, an unincorporated organization or similar company, a syndicate or any other group formed for the purpose of acquiring, holding, or disposing of securities of an insured institutionº. (See Williams, Fleck, and Comizio (1987, p. 297) ). Hence, the combined ownership of any group of shareholders acting in concertÐincluding managers, their families, and their outside business partnersÐis limited to 10%.
A key issue in the application of the Rule is the way in which the term ªacting in concertº is defined. For purposes of the Rule, a group is considered to be acting in concert when ªparticipants are aware of the common design and knowingly participate thereinº (12 C.F.R. § 563 b.3(i)(8)(i) (1986) and 12 C.F.R. § 574.2(c).) Hence, the limitation generally does not apply to managers or directors as a group unless they knowingly act as a group, but the decision of when the limitation does apply is ultimately left to the courts. Note, however, that a thrift's tax-qualified employee stock benefit plan may acquire up to 25% of any class of the institution's equity without prior approval of regulators (12 C.F.R. § 563 b.3(i)(5)(v)).
The Rule also allows a converting thrift to include in its new stock charter provisions that prohibit, for a period of up to five years, (1) an offer to acquire or an acquisition of more than 10% of the converted institution's securities, (2) cumulative voting for directors, and (3) shareholders' ability to call special meetings relating to a change in the control of the institution or in its charter amendments.(12 C.F.R. § § 563b.3(i)7, 552.4(b)(8) (1986) ). This
The relative expense preferences of mutual firms and stock firms have been studied 5 extensively. See, for example, Masulis (1987) or Mester (1991) .
five-year limitation on ownership is even more stringent than the three-year limitation because it prohibits acquisition of more than 10% of equity without regard to regulatory approval.
Congresss reason for these ownership restrictions was twofold. First, it sought to persuade the managers of mutual thrifts to support conversion to stock organizations.
Because managers of a mutual thrift control the firms assets free of direction by depositors, who are the legal owners of the firm, these managers enjoy a virtual lifetime compensation contract. They can engage in perquisite consumption that reduces firm value as long as their actions are not so brazen as to instigate a run by depositors. By protecting these managers from the market for 5 corporate control during the three to five years following conversion, Congress sought to encourage them to support proposed conversions. Recognizing that the five-year protection period might not be sufficient to induce some managers to support conversion, the FHLBB in its November 1986 amendments to the Conversion Regulation sought to reduce the thrift managers uncertainty by emphasizing and justifying the use of employee stock ownership plans as a way to reduce exposure to unwanted takeovers (see Williams, Fleck, and Comizio (1987, p. 271) ).
Congress also was concerned about the potential for managerial abuses of inside information. The initial stockholders of a converted thrift gain ownership of assets in place as well as their initial investment. Therefore, they receive a wealth transfer from the former depositors, who previously owned assets in place, unless those depositors purchase equity in -8- Williams, Fleck, and Comizio (1987) The Rule also weakens managers' incentives to create value for shareholders. Jensen and Murphy (1990) argue that these incentives depend on the fraction of the firm's equity held by managers. The Rule's 10% limit on managerial equity investment in the firm is -9-In general, converted institutions are not permitted to purchase their own stock for a 8 period of three years after conversion except under special situations that also require regulatory approval. See Williams (1994, pp. 7-39) for discussion of these special situations.
significantly lower than the average ownership by all officers and directors reported for nonregulated industries (e.g., Mehran, 1992 and McConnell and Servaes, 1990) .
By limiting ownership, the Rule also restricts equity-based managerial compensation, thus weakening the link between pay and performance. For example, although stock options may be granted to managers at the time of conversion (subject to later shareholder approval), a manager may hold no more than 10% of the thrifts outstanding stock after conversion.
(See Williams, Fleck, and Comizio (1987, p. 280) ). Thus, the sum of a managers direct equity ownership and potential ownership in the form equity-based compensation is also limited to 10% for a period of three to five years after conversion. A maximum equity investment of 10% may not be large enough to motivate managers to make value-maximizing decisions, however. In fact, the limitations effects may be felt even longer, as managers may take additional years to increase their percentage ownership share of the firm significantly.
The 10% ownership restrictions can also constrain a firms financial policies. For example, a thrifts repurchase of its own stock that would increase a managers ownership above 10%, or a thrifts issue of convertible debt that in the event of conversion would push the lender above 10% ownership of the firms equity, would be a violation of the Rule.
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To summarize, the Post-Conversion Anti-takeover Rule can affect the performance of a converted thrift institution by limiting ownership by insiders and outside blockholders. By restricting insider ownership, the Rule weakens the link between effort and reward. This -10-suggests that managerial ownership should increase, and firm performance should improve, after the ownership limitations expire. By restricting outside block ownership, the Rule also weakens the disciplinary role of the market for corporate control, thus entrenching managers.
This suggests that outside block ownership should increase, and firm performance should improve, after limitations expire. In this study, we examine whether expiration of the Rule does in fact lead to increased firm ownership by insiders and by outside blockholders and whether any such increases are linked to improved performance.
Data and Methodology
Our analysis is based on the performance and ownership characteristics of 88 FSLICinsured thrift institutions that converted from mutual to stock ownership during 1983-87 and that following conversion were publicly traded on the New York Stock Exchange, or the American Stock Exchange, or in the over-the-counter market for at least seven years. The firms were identified by cross-referencing a list of mutual thrifts that filed applications for conversion with the FHLBB during 1983-87 against a list of publicly traded thrifts compiled by SNL Securities of Charlottesville, VA, and against the 1993 Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. FHLBB regulations required that all thrifts seeking to convert from mutual to stock ownership file an application with and obtain the approval of the FHLBB prior to conversion. Status as a publicly-traded thrift an active thrift subsidiary as of year-end 1993 was confirmed using information from the Bloomberg Financial News
Network.
-11-Because year-end 1994 stock-price data were not available at the time of this study, Corporation. Within a year of the recapitalization announcement, the thrift was trading at $5.00 per share, for an annual stock return of more than 500%.
This procedure produced an initial sample of 96 firms. We eliminated five thrifts for which we were unable to obtain ownership data for at least one year in both the preexpiration and post-expiration periods. For the remaining 91 firms, we are able to construct market-based performance measures for each of the three years before and at least the first year after expiration of the anti-takeover provisions. To ensure that our results were not 9 influenced by contaminating events, we analyzed these performance measures for outliers.
Twelve firms had reported post-expiration annual returns in excess of 100%. We investigated news reports about these firms appearing in the American Banker and identified three whose returns were clearly attributable to factors other than changes in ownership structure. We 10 removed these three firms from the initial sample, leaving a final sample of 88 firms. As -12-shown in table 1, the 88 thrifts comprise 19% of the 473 thrifts that converted from mutual to stock ownership during 1983-87.
We define the pre-expiration measurement period, which we denote years -3, -2, and -1 in relation to expiration, as the three full calendar years preceding the expiration of the antitakeover provisions (see Fig. 1 ). Because conversion occurred during year -5 relative to expiration, this procedure excludes any stock-price effects associated with the firm's initial public offering. We define the post-expiration measurement period, which we denote years 1, 2, and 3 in relation to expiration, as the first, second, and third full calendar years after expiration of the anti-takeover provisions. Excluded from both measurement periods is the calendar year during which the anti-takeover provisions expired. Therefore, the firm's ownership structure is restricted throughout our pre-expiration measurement periods, but unrestricted throughout our post-expiration measurement period. Moreover, this excludes any stock-price effects associated with expiration of the anti-takeover provisions in year 0. We construct our annual performance measures using stock-price data obtained from CRSP for 1984-93.
Because we focus on conversions occurring during a small number of years, the performance of our sample firms in the pre-and post-expiration periods is likely to have been affected by changes in the thrift industry and the economy as a whole. In the late 1980s, the thrift industry suffered large losses as a result of lax underwriting practices coupled with declining commercial real estate prices. Associated with those losses were large declines in the share prices of thrifts.
In the early 1990s, share prices rose significantly as the commercial real estate market stabilized and the most financially troubled thrifts were sold or -13-Clearly, adjusting for the wide differences in thrift industry returns observed at 11 different times during the sample period is a key issue. Because we use the medianadjusted return as our performance measure, our results are robust with respect to selection of the control group of firms. Results are qualitatively unchanged when thrifts in the tails of the return distribution are omitted from the control group.
Schedule 13F is filed with the SEC by institutional investors that manage more 12 than $100 million in assets, and schedules 13D and 13G are filed with the SEC or OTS (depending on with which agency the company files) by every stockholder (individual or corporation) that owns 5% or more of a publicly-held U.S. corporation.
Schedule 13D also requires disclosure of the stockholders intent, e.g., for purposes of closed. As shown in table 2, the median stock returns for non-sample publicly traded thrifts were negative in 1986, 1987, 1989, and 1990 , with a low of -41.9% in 1990, but were positive in 1985, 1988, and 1991-93 , with a high of 61.0% in 1992. To control for influences that produced these wide swings in industry performance, for each sample thrift's performance measure we subtract the median annual return for a control group of non-sample publicly traded thrifts from the sample thrift's annual stock return (where annual returns are measured from year-end to year-end.)
We created our control group by combining a list of publicly traded thrifts obtained from SNL Securities with an analogous list obtained from the Office of Thrift Supervision and omitting the 96 converting thrifts in the initial sample. To control for differences in size and location, we omitted non-sample thrifts trading on the NYSE or AMEX, as most of our sample firms trade over the counter.
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Data on insider ownership came from firm proxy statements, data on institutional block ownership from schedule 13F filings compiled by CDA Technologies of Rockville, MD, and data on ESOP and noninstitutional block ownership from Schedule 13D and 13G
filings. We construct separate measures for institutional and noninstitutional block 12 -14-investment or for purposes of control.
The means for years -3, -2, and -1 and for years 1, 2, and 3 are calculated as the 13 average of each firms three-year means.
ownership because the motivations of these two groups of blockholders may differ (e.g., Holderness and Sheehan, 1988, p. 323.) 4. Results
Unadjusted stock returns
Column 2 in panels A and B, table 3 shows unadjusted average stock returns for the sample firms. The mean for the pre-expiration period is 1.15%, not significantly different from zero, whereas the mean for the post-expiration period is 40.87%. The 39. 72 13 percentage point difference in performance between the two periods is statistically significant at the 1% level. These results should be viewed with caution, however, because they are heavily influenced by trends that influenced the performance of the thrift industry as a whole.
Industry-adjusted stock returns
Column 3 in panels A and B, table 3 shows average industry-adjusted stock returns for years -3 to -1 and years 1 to 3. The sample firms' performance exceeded that of the control group in both the pre-expiration and post-expiration periods and was better after the antitakeover provisions expired. The mean industry-adjusted return for the pre-expiration period is 8.69%, significant at the 1% level, whereas the mean for the post-expiration period is -15-11.83%, also significant at the 1% level. The 3.14 percentage point difference between the two periods, however, is not statistically different from zero.
4.3 Abnormal industry-adjusted stock returns Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992) observe that the appropriate benchmark for postmerger performance depends on the relation, if any, between pre-and post-merger performance. Similar logic applies to the relation, if any, between the performance of the sample firms before and after expiration of the anti-takeover provisions. If there is no relation, the appropriate benchmark for measuring post-expiration performance is zero. If there is a relation, the appropriate benchmark is the pre-expiration industry-adjusted return.
To test whether firm performance improved following expiration of the anti-takeover provisions, we employ a variation of the methodology used by Healy, Palepu, and Ruback to the post-expiration period. Here, 1 is equivalent to the difference in performance from the pre-to the post-expiration period appearing at the bottom of table 3. We can reject this restriction at standard significance levels.
To control for potential differences in firms that converted in different years, we re- performance. Hence, the intercept 1 is independent of pre-expiration returns.
14 As shown in table 4, the estimated intercept is 14.1%, significant at the 1% level.
This indicates that stock returns increased 14.1% per year during the three years following expiration of the anti-takeover provisions, after controlling for pre-expiration performance.
This finding is strong evidence of significant improvement in performance following the removal of restrictions on firm ownership structure. As with the performance data, we obtain firm-specific values for each measure in the three years before and after expiration of the anti-takeover provisions. We test for differences in pre-and post-expiration ownership structure using the t-statistic: In interpreting the results, it is important to remember that the 10% limitation on ownership applies to ªany group of persons acting in concert.º This language means that the constraint can be binding even when the largest reported percentage ownership by a single investor is less than 10%, and that the combined ownership by all insiders or institutional investors can exceed 10% without imposing a binding constraint as long as the FHLBB does not consider the group to be acting in concert. In practice, the ultimate decision about whether a group of investors are constrained by the 10% limitation rests with the courts. Table 5 presents descriptive statistics on the largest percentage ownership by a single officer or director. In columns 2 through 5 are the total number of firms, the number of firms where insiders owned at least some stock, and the minimum and maximum ownership percentages. Comparison of columns 2 and 3 reveals that insider ownership was positive for all firms in each period except year -3. Column 5 shows that the maximum ownership percentage in each of the three pre-expiration years was 10%, indicating that the anti-takeover rules constraint was binding for at least one firm in each year; further analysis of the data for individual firms reveals that the largest percentage ownership by an insider was more than 9%
in at least one of the three pre-expiration years for five different firms.
Column 6 gives averages by year as well as t-statistics for the differences in the preand post-expiration period means. The annual pre-expiration means range from 2.97% to 3.71% with a three-year average of 3.32%, whereas the annual post-expiration means range from 5.36% to 5.99% with a three-year average of 5.52%. The t-statistic for the 2.20 -19-percentage point difference between the period means is 3.28, significant at the 1% level.
The bulk of this difference arises from year -1 to year +1, when the mean percentage ownership by the largest insider increases from 3.71% to 5.36%. This 1.65 percentage point difference is significant at the 5% level.
Earlier studies show that CEO compensation in the thrift industry (Cole and Mehran, 1991 ) and the banking industry (Houston and James, 1993) relies less on stock options than it does in other industries. Therefore, we speculate that most of the increase in ownership by insiders resulted from their direct purchase of their firm's stock through dealers or brokers rather than from accumulation of shares through the exercise of stock options. reported that the largest noninstitutional blockholder owned more than 9% of the firm in at least one of the three pre-expiration years.
The pre-expiration means for the largest percentage ownership by a noninstitutional blockholder range from 2.40% to 4.37% with a three-year average of 3.71%, whereas the post-expiration means range from 4.54% to 5.24% with a three-year average of 4.68%
(column 6). The t-statistic for the 0.97 percentage point difference between the period means is 1.58 (p-value = 0.12). schedules from which we obtained our ESOP ownership data.
shows that for 20 firms, the largest percentage ownership by an institutional investor was more than 9% in at least one of the three pre-expiration years.
The pre-expiration means for the largest percentage ownership by an institutional investor (shown in column 6) range from 4.48% to 4.69%, with a three-year average of 4.59%, whereas the post-expiration means range from 4.36% to 4.75%, with a three-year average of 4.85%. The 0.26 percentage point difference between the period means is not significantly different from zero. columns 2 and 3 reveals that in only a small fraction of the sample firmsÐnine firms in the pre-expiration period and 13 in the post-expiration periodÐdid ESOPs own more than 5% of the firms equity. Consequently, the average ownership percentages for the entire sample are quite small. The pre-expiration means for percentage ownership by ESOPs range from 0.53% to 0.79%, with a three-year average of 0.60%, whereas the post-expiration means range from 1.04% to 1.57%, with a three-year average of 1.23% (column 6). The t-statistic for the 0.63 percentage point difference between the period means is 3.04, significant at the 1% level.
Although the percentages of shares held by these ESOPs do not appear large enough to deter a takeover threat, these percentages are biased downward (see note 21). Moreover, these are the percentages actually allocated to leveraged ESOPs rather than the percentages -22-
In the case of a leveraged ESOP, a firm may purchase shares for the ESOP with 21 borrowed funds. The shares are allocated to the ESOP only as the debt is retired.
The IRS could argue, however, that neither the loan nor the subsequent purchases 22 of employer stock was for the exclusive benefit of ESOP participants and beneficiaries, so that the ESOP trust would lose its tax qualification, rendering any contributions to the ESOP nondeductible and rendering earnings of the trust taxable.
allowed under the adopted plans. These thrifts could use a previously established ESOP to 21 secure loans to purchase additional employer stock in an effort to defeat a tender offer.
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In summary, we find significant changes in firm ownership structure following expiration of the anti-takeover provisions. Ownership by insiders, by noninstitutional outside blockholders, by institutional blockholders, and by ESOPs increased, and these increases were statistically significant for insiders and ESOPs. Together, the results in panels B and C of table 9 provide evidence, in support of Holderness and Sheehan (1988) , that the identify of large blockholders is important to the functioning of the market for corporate control because the roles, and possibly the motivations, of institutional and noninstitutional blockholders differ. We speculate that the institutional blockholders, who by definition manage more than $100 million is assets, held -26-shares of our sample thrifts solely for investment purposes, whereas the noninstitutional blockholders held shares not only for investment purposes but also for control purposes.
Indeed, a review of the blockholders reasons for filing reveals no case in which institutions filed for purposes of control, but numerous cases in which noninstitutional blockholders did so. Moreover, newly converted thrifts are, for the most part, small-capitalization stocks with market values in the $5 million to $50 million range that trade infrequently. It is costly for institutional investors to monitor such small firms, so they are likely to act only as passive investors. This is an interesting issue, one that we leave for future research.
Finally, estimation of eq. (5) (panel D, table 9) produces a coefficient for 8 ESOP ownership of -15.7 (marginally significant, p-value = 0.11), indicating that during i the post-expiration period the annual return of sample firms was 15.7% less per year when ownership by the firms ESOP increased. This finding at least suggests that ESOPs were adopted by sample firms as an impediment to potential acquirers, weakening the market for corporate control and is consistent with that of Gordon and Pound (1990) , who document a negative stock market reaction when an ESOP is adopted in the presence of takeover activity.
Summary and Conclusions
In this study, we investigate whether regulatory restrictions on the ownership of public companies harm performance by preventing firms from choosing the best ownership structure.
Using data for a sample of thrift institutions that converted from a mutual to a stock form of organization, we examine stock-price performance and ownership structure before and after -27-the expiration of regulatory anti-takeover provisions that limit the percentage of a firms stock that may be owned by an inside or outside investor.
These anti-takeover provisions, which were put in place to induce the managers of mutual thrifts to convert to stock ownership, create a natural laboratory for testing the impact of regulatory restrictions on ownership structure and the market for corporate control. The anti-takeover rule discussed here typifies a pattern of legislative and regulatory interference in capital markets (see Roe, 1990) . Regulations often have subtle and unintended effects that in some cases turn out to be of first-order importance.
We find that after the anti-takeover provisions expire, insider ownership increases and firm performance improves significantly. Moreover, we link increases in insider ownership to improvement in firm performance. We also find that percentage ownership by noninstitutional outside blockholders increases following expiration of the anti-takeover provisions, and link these increases to improvement in firm performance. By constraining insider ownership, the anti-takeover rule weakens the link between reward and performance (Jensen and Murphy, 1990) . By constraining outsider ownership, the rule also weakens the disciplinary role of the market for corporate control, thus entrenching managers (Jensen and Ruback, 1983) . Although our findings do not resolve debate over whether the net economic effect of the anti-takeover provisions is positive or negative, they do provide evidence that the provisions interfere with the firms ownership structure and, in turn, firm performance.
In contrast to our findings for noninstitutional blockholders, we find neither significant changes in percentage ownership by institutional blockholders nor a significant relation between changes in percentage ownership by institutional investors and firm performance.
-28-Others (e.g., Demsetz, 1993) argue that individual investors seldom own enough 26 equity to allow shareholders the optimal degree of control over management.
These results support the findings of Holderness and Sheehan (1988) , who argue that the identify of large blockholders is important to the market for corporate control because their motivations may differ. One explanation for the lack of correlation between institutional ownership and firm performance is that institutional investors specialize in risk-sharing, and are unlikely to have a comparative advantage in monitoring management (e.g., Plosser, 1993) . We suggest a different explanation for our findingsÐthat institutional blockholders -31- -33- Table 3 Average annual stock returns for publicly traded thrifts for the three years preceding and the three years following the expiration of regulatory restrictions on firm ownership structure Test statistic for significant differences between the means for years -3, -2, and -1 and years 1, 2, and 3.
e -34--35- Table 4 Excess industry-adjusted stock returns of publicly traded thrifts for the three years preceding and the three years following the expiration of regulatory restrictions on firm ownership structure.
These restrictions limit ownership by any person or group of persons acting in concert to 10% of the firm's outstanding shares during the five years following conversion from mutual to stock organization. Industryadjusted returns are calculated as the firm-specific annual return less the median industry annual return. period (years 1, 2, and 3) and IAR is the mean for the pre-expiration period (years -3, -2, and -1).
pre-expiration,i
The intercept term is the industry-adjusted measure of excess performance.
Coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1.0% level.
a -36- Table 5 Average ownership of publicly traded thrifts by the insiders with the largest shareholdings for the three years preceding and the three years following the expiration of regulatory restrictions on firm ownership structure.
These restrictions limit ownership by any person or group of persons acting in concert to 10% of the firm's outstanding shares during the five years following conversion from mutual to stock organization. 1983, 1984, 1986, and 1987 , fewer than three years of ownership data a are available either before or after expiration of the anti-takeover provisions. See figure 1.
Test statistic for significant differences between the mean for pre-expiration years -3, -2, and -1 and b the mean for post-expiration years 1, 2, and 3.
Statistically significant difference at the 1.0% level. Test statistic for significant differences between pre-expiration year -1 and post-expiration year 1. Statistically significant difference at the 5.0% level. e -37- Table 6 Average ownership of publicly traded thrifts by the noninstitutional blockholders with the largest shareholdings for the three years preceding and the three years following the expiration of regulatory restrictions on firm ownership structure. Test statistic for significant differences between the mean for pre-expiration years -3, -2, and -1 and the c mean for post-expiration years 1, 2, and 3.
Statistically significant difference at the 10.0% level.
d Table 7 Average ownership of publicly traded thrifts by the institutional blockholders with the largest shareholdings for the three years preceding and the three years following the expiration of regulatory restrictions on firm ownership structure.
These restrictions limit ownership by any person or group of persons acting in concert to 10% of the firm's outstanding shares during the five years following conversion from mutual to stock organization. Test statistic for significant differences between the mean for pre-expiration years -3, -2, and -1 and the c mean for post-expiration years 1, 2, and 3.
-40- Table 8 Average ownership of publicly traded thrifts by employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) for the three years preceding and the three years following the expiration of regulatory restrictions on firm ownership structure.
These restrictions limit ownership by the firms ESOP to 25% of the firms outstanding shares during the five years following conversion from mutual to stock organization. 1983, 1984, 1986, and 1987 , fewer than three years of ownership data are a available either before or after expiration of the antitakeover provisions. See figure 1.
Test statistic for significant differences between the mean for pre-expiration years -3, -2, and -1 and the b mean for post-expiration years 1, 2, and 3.
Statistically significant difference at the 1.0% level.
c -41- Table 9 The effect on firm performance of changes in ownership of publicly traded thrifts from the three years preceding to the three years following the expiration of regulatory restrictions on firm ownership structure.
These restrictions limit ownership by any person or group of persons acting in concert to 10% of the firm's outstanding shares and by the firms ESOP to 25% of outstanding shares during the five years following conversion from mutual to stock organization. Availability of ownership data before and after expiration of five-year anti-takeover protection for thrifts converting from mutual to stock ownership in 1983-87.
Ownership data were collected for calendar years 1987-93, so that at least one year of ownership data is available before and after expiration of the anti-takeover protection for each converting thrift. Years -3, -2, and -1 comprise the pre-expiration period, and years +1, +2, and +3 comprise the post-expiration period.
|< ownership data available 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Note: C denotes the year of conversion, and E denotes the year that antitakeover protection expired.
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